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“How Well Do You Know Your Krai?” 
The Kraevedenie Revival and Patriotic 
Politics in Late Khrushchev-Era Russia
Victoria Donovan
The Twenty-Second Communist Party Congress, in 1961, marked a turning 
point in post-Stalin politics. Following the dramatic revelations of the Secret 
Speech in 1956, the Congress provided a forum in which these events could 
be worked into a teleological narrative and reinterpreted as grist to the mill 
in the march toward communism. In place of ideological equivocation and 
political anxiety, the Congress off ered the people of the Soviet Union a con-
crete set of values and ideals in the form of the “Moral Code of the Builder of 
Communism” and the new Program of the Communist Party. At the Congress, 
Nikita Khrushchev employed a characteristic construction metaphor to evoke 
the changes that were about to take place in the socialist state. Once the foun-
dations of the “glorious house of communism” had been laid, he explained, 
the “walls” of the building—a surplus of material and cultural goods—could 
be raised and the redistribution of national wealth could fi nally take place.1
The Third Program was ostensibly focused on the future. Famously, com-
munism was supposed to be achieved by 1980. However, in the post-1961 pe-
riod, the prerevolutionary and Soviet past became one of the most important 
focuses of Soviet cultural work as political elites attempted to establish new 
sites of national memory that could bind the country together. The past pro-
vided a source of heroes, myths, and icons to mobilize and spur the nation 
forward along the path to communism. In an attempt to foster national pa-
triotism, certain elements of the past were “objectivized” in institutions of 
cultural memory, such as museums and monuments, and commemorated in 
text, in tourist guides and history books. Familiarization with a particular vi-
sion of the national and local past, it was hoped, would make Soviet citizens 
aware of their place in the nation’s history and their role in turning the last 
page of that volume, the construction of communism.
This article focuses on the local dimension of this process and specifi cally 
on the revival of the discipline of kraevedenie, a multidisciplinary form of lo-
cal study repressed at the end of the 1920s for its “bourgeois passéism” and 
localist inclinations. I argue that the promotion of local historical knowledge 
at this time constituted part of the eff ort to strengthen popular support for 
the Soviet regime during the second phase of de-Stalinization. Local com-
munities were encouraged to turn inward at this time, to contemplate their 
history and traditions in an eff ort to stimulate popular allegiance to the ide-
This article is based on doctoral research carried out as part of an AHRC-funded project ti-
tled “National Identity in Russia since 1961: Traditions and Deterritorialisation” (2007–11). 
I would like to thank the AHRC for its support and also the two readers for Slavic Review 
whose anonymous reports on an earlier version of this article were extremely helpful.
1. Programma KPSS, section 1, part 1, August 2, 1961.
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als and values of the Soviet state. However, the regime’s strategic affi  rmation 
of regional identity had unintended consequences, giving rise to feelings of 
regional specifi city and manifestations of local patriotism that were at odds 
with the integrational logic of Soviet historical discourse. By stimulating local 
historical consciousness, I argue, the state opened the way for individuals to 
question the integrity of the offi  cial script, laying the foundations for a frag-
mentation of national memory along regional lines.
With its focus on the political restructuring of the post-1961 period, this 
article contributes to a corpus of scholarly literature dedicated to the exca-
vation of thaw-era politics and culture. This literature has questioned the 
facile understanding of the post-1956 period as an era of political liberalism 
and  cultural rejuvenation, drawing attention to the reality of continued re-
pression, heightened social control, and cultural re-ideologization under 
the Khrushchev leadership.2 The article understands 1961 as a critical junc-
ture in post-Stalin politics and highlights the offi  cial deployment of history 
as one component in a broader strategy of popular mobilization that emerged 
in this second phase of de-Stalinization. In this way, my argument intersects 
with another dynamic fi eld of academic analysis, that of memory politics and 
nation building.3 The focus on local rather than national memory, however, 
centers attention not only on the means by which cultural heritage can be 
manipulated to mold social identity but also on the diffi  culties that emerge 
when this process takes place simultaneously on national and local stages. 
Thus, while contributing to the study of practices of commemoration in the 
Soviet context, this study also sheds light on center-region relations in the 
Khrushchev era, scrutinizing institutional tendencies and tensions that help 
us understand the emergence of more outspoken forms of localism in the late 
Soviet era.
(Re)Turning to History in the Late Khrushchev Era
The historical turn of the late Khrushchev era was certainly not the fi rst time 
that the state had strategically deployed history with the intention of bolster-
2. See, for example, Polly Jones, ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiat-
ing Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (London, 2006); Miriam Dobson, 
Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform aft er Stalin 
(Ithaca, 2009); Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith, eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita 
Khrushchev (London, 2009); and Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic, eds., Khrushchev in the 
Kremlin: Policy and Governance in the Soviet Union, 1953–1964 (London, 2011).
3. The literature on memory politics and nation building in Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russia is by now vast and various. Some of the most important works in this corpus in-
clude Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1983); 
Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change 
(New York, 1999); Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1995: 
Myth, Memories, and Monuments (Cambridge, Eng., 2006); Stephen Bittner, The Many Lives 
of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca, 2008); David 
Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern 
Russian National Identity, 1931–1956 (Cambridge, Mass., 2002); and Frederick C. Corney, 
Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution (Ithaca, 2004).
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ing the legitimacy and popularity of the Soviet regime. As David Branden-
berger and Kevin Platt, among others, have eff ectively demonstrated, Iosif 
Stalin and his entourage were preoccupied with historical revisionism in the 
name of Soviet state building as early as the mid-1930s. Brandenberger argues 
that “the Stalinist party hierarchy’s deployment of Russian national heroes, 
myths, and iconography was essentially a pragmatic move to augment the 
more arcane aspects of Marxist Leninism with populist rhetoric designed to 
bolster Soviet state legitimacy and promote a society-wide sense of allegiance 
to the USSR.”4 Pragmatic populism gradually ceded to patriotic extremism 
during World War II, when historians began to mine Russian history for in-
spirational material that would spur the nation forward in its struggle against 
Nazism. If Russian nationalist rhetoric was curtailed in the wake of the war, 
the late 1940s were marked by a crackdown on republican historiographies, 
which were castigated for “nationalist errors” and the endorsement of non-
Russian Slavic historical narratives.5 By Stalin’s death, the confl ation of “Rus-
sian” and “Soviet” had become commonplace, as revealed, most famously, 
by Stalin’s May 1945 toast to the Russian people as the primus inter pares of 
nations forming the Soviet Union.
If the Stalinist party hierarchy made use of prerevolutionary Russian 
heroes, myths, and iconography in a pragmatic attempt to market Marxist-
Leninist rhetoric to a marginally educated citizenry, the focus of Khrushchev-
era historicizing was the Soviet, rather than Russian, national past.6 The 
post-Stalin leadership’s main concern was to impress on the population the 
Communist Party’s continued legitimacy and to fi nd an appropriate way to 
conceptualize the relationship between the Khrushchev administration and 
the delegitimized Stalinist regime. Rather than drawing on the symbols of 
Russian national identity, many of which were compromised through their as-
sociation with Stalin and his cult of personality, Khrushchev reached back to 
recent history—the achievements and triumphs of the fi rst half of the socialist 
twentieth century. The revolution and WWII replaced the Battles of Borodino 
and Kulikovo as the central sites of Soviet memory, and proletarian heroes 
were substituted for the nation-building tsars as the idols of national history.
Another way in which the Khrushchev-era historical revival diff ered from 
earlier appropriations of the past was through its treatment of local memory. 
The ideal of Russian history that had been promoted during the 1930s and 
1940s had been extremely conservative, comprising a pantheon of Russian na-
tional heroes and symbols that were intended to foster a sense of allegiance 
and identifi cation with the Soviet state.7 As Serhy Yekelchyk has demonstrated, 
4. Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, 4.
5. Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the So-
viet Historical Imagination (Toronto, 2004), 20–21.
6. David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, 1–10; D. L. Brandenberger and A. M. 
Dubrovsky, “‘The People Need a Tsar’: The Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist 
Ideology, 1931–1941,” Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 5 (July 1998): 873–92.
7. Brandenberger and Platt cite Aleksandr Nevskii, Kuz΄ma Minin, Dmitrii Pozharskii, 
Ivan Susanin, Aleksandr Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov, Mikhail Lomonosov, and Aleksandr 
Pushkin as the most important prerevolutionary fi gures within this pantheon. David 
Brandenberger and Kevin M. F. Platt, “Introduction: Tsarist-Era Heroes in Stalinist Mass 
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elites in the Soviet republics were required to bring their national histories into 
line with the Russian “grand narrative” at this time, replacing recalcitrant ele-
ments in the national past with fi gures and events that demonstrated the tradi-
tion of “friendship between the peoples.”8 And this was not only the case for 
the national republics. Many of the Russian regions, whose  histories bore 
testament to their struggle against centralizing pressures exerted by Moscow, 
were also required to whitewash their pasts. Stalinist “russocentric etatism,” 
to borrow Brandenberger’s term, must therefore be understood not only as a 
weapon directed against non-Russian historical traditions but also as one that 
engaged in self-censorship, substituting a multivoiced national narrative for a 
hegemonic discourse of unifi cation and national heroism.
Khrushchev’s approach to national mythmaking was, by contrast, remark-
ably decentered. Rather than limiting history to a centrally determined canon 
of myths and heroes, local elites were empowered to craft  their own narratives 
of Soviet patriotism. The revival of kraevedenie as a fi eld of study was an 
important vehicle in this process.9 Beginning in 1956 with the rehabilitation 
of several local kraevedcheskie publications, the movement grew throughout 
the 1960s to form a developed institutional infrastructure for the production 
and documentation of local knowledge. Within the forums provided by the 
kraevedenie movement, local populations were encouraged to turn inward 
to examine the particular role their locality had played in national historical 
events and to celebrate their local heroes and heroines. This is not to suggest 
that local history was entirely freed from the shackles of ideology. Indeed, 
regional elites were still obliged to demonstrate allegiance to the Khrushchev-
era ideals of internationalism, collective leadership, and democratism in their 
narratives of the local past. Nevertheless, this decentralization of initiative to 
the regions constituted an important turning point in the production of his-
torical knowledge, resulting in a vastly more diverse and complex picture of 
the past than had ever been possible in the Stalin era.
Kraevedenie as a Vehicle for Participatory Politics
To understand the motivation for Khrushchev’s turn to history, the political 
 exigencies of the post-Stalin moment must be taken into account.  Having 
 rejected the idea of an omnipotent leader, whose wisdom could resolve the 
 paradox between the enlightenment agenda of the Soviet regime and the op-
pressive reality of life under Soviet rule, the Khrushchev government found 
itself in need of new sources of political legitimation.10 This need was exacer-
bated by the emergence of new social tensions aft er WWII, a consequence of 
Culture,” in Kevin M. F. Platt and David Brandenberger, eds., Epic Revisionism: Russian 
History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda (Madison, 2006), 4–5.
8. Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory, 20–21.
9. For an informative account of the vexed fate of the kraevedenie movement in the 
early Soviet period, see Emily D. Johnson, How St. Petersburg Learned to Study Itself: The 
Russian Idea of Kraevedenie (University Park, 2006).
10. Alexei Yurchak draws on Claude Lefort’s reasoning to argue that Stalin consti-
tuted an authoritative “master fi gure, whose presence was able to resolve the paradox 
between a doctrine of enlightenment and emancipation and its illiberal implementation.” 
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mass urban migration and social alienation, as well as a growth in consumer-
ist  demands, particularly among Soviet youth.11 Of particular concern to the 
Soviet authorities at this time was the rise in “hooliganism,” a malaise that 
referred to all manner of uncivilized behavior, from swearing in the street to 
petty crime.12 The authorities located the roots of such antisocial behavior in 
the general absence of a revolutionary fi ghting spirit and disengagement from 
politics, particularly among young people. In order to fi ght such  tendencies 
and reignite the fl ame of popular enthusiasm for the socialist project, the 
government endorsed a far-reaching program of re-ideologization that would 
reach all sectors of Soviet society.13 The study of Soviet history would form 
a core pillar of this program, orientating the nation toward the social and 
economic successes of the recent past and inspiring their awe anew for the 
modernizing state of which they were a privileged part.
Why, then, did this turn to history take the specifi c form of a rehabilita-
tion of local historical knowledge? The answer to this question can be found 
in the policy priorities of the 1961 Third Program, Khrushchev’s manifesto to 
reunite Soviet society following the dramatic revelations of the Secret Speech. 
The program’s main argument was that the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” 
the state of aff airs that had been nominally upheld by the Stalinist regime, 
had run its course and could now be replaced by an “all-people’s state.”14 In 
this new people-led government, Khrushchev explained, existing state organs 
would “wither away,” yielding their responsibilities to mass-populated volun-
tary organizations that would eventually assume all of the state’s functions. 
In order to achieve this utopian objective, Khrushchev endorsed the creation 
of social movements that could embody the goals of mass mobilization and 
participatory democracy. The result was the post-1961 proliferation of volun-
tary organizations, from trade unions and workers’ committees, comrades’ 
courts and street patrols, to housing committees, women’s councils, and vet-
Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation 
(Princeton, 2006), 10–11.
11. For a discussion of the tensions involved in the growth of materialism in the 
Khrushchev period, see Christine Varga-Harris, “Homemaking and the Aesthetic and 
Moral Perimeters of the Soviet Home during the Khrushchev Era,” Journal of Social His-
tory 41, no. 3 (Spring 2008): 561–89; Susan E. Reid, “Khrushchev Modern: Agency and 
Modernization in the Soviet Home,” Cahiers du monde russe 47, nos. 1/2 (January–June 
2006): 227–68; and Susan E. Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and De-Stalinization 
of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 61, no. 2 (Sum-
mer 2002): 211–52.
12. For a discussion of the political discourse around hooliganism in the post-Stalin 
period, see Brian LaPierre, Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Russia: Defi ning, Policing, and Pro-
ducing Deviance during the Thaw (Madison, 2012); and Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Gen-
eration: Soviet Post-War Youth and The Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford, 2010), 
181–88.
13. The ideological foundation stones for this process were the Moral Code of the 
Builder of Communism and the new Program of the Communist Party, both launched at 
the Twenty-Second Party Congress of 1961. See Programma KPSS, section 1, part 1, Au-
gust 2, 1961. For a discussion of the political thrust of the Third Party Program, see Alex-
ander Titov, “The 1961 Party Programme and the Fate of Khrushchev’s Reforms,” in Ilic 
and Smith, eds., Soviet State and Society, 8–26.
14. Titov, “The 1961 Party Programme.”
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erans’ associations.15 In this context, the revival of the kraevedenie move-
ment, a quintessential “mass” organization, was a logical step. Like other 
voluntary organizations of its kind, the movement was intended to devolve 
authority—in this case, over the production of historical and cultural knowl-
edge of the regions—from the state to the masses. History would no longer be 
the preserve of an unrepresentative and removed intellectual elite but rather 
part of a democratic process, the ultimate expression of Khrushchev-era par-
ticipatory politics.
Kraevedenie as a Vehicle for Patriotic Politics
It would be a mistake, however, to say that the “turn to history” in post-Stalin 
society was driven exclusively by the political administration. Patriotic ele-
ments within the Soviet cultural elite were also instrumental in generating 
interest in the national past. Reacting to the dramatic social changes of the 
two postwar decades, many conservative writers, journalists, and cultural 
commentators spoke out in the 1960s about the need for the Russian nation 
to preserve its cultural identity by raising awareness of its past and tradi-
tions.16 Russian patriots, like their Soviet counterparts, located the roots of 
social discontent in the Russian people’s sense of disconnectedness, albeit 
from the Russian rather than the Soviet past. This argument’s structural par-
allelism with the government’s promotion of Soviet patriotism meant that its 
proponents could nuance their criticisms and link them to offi  cial reasoning, 
a stance that allowed them to defend themselves against accusations of anti-
modernist or, worse, anti-Soviet sentiment.
Perhaps the most agile cultural commentator to walk this line was the 
medievalist and public intellectual Dmitrii Likhachev. A former political pris-
oner, who had been rehabilitated in 1936 and established himself as a leading 
light among intellectual talents in the 1940s and 1950s, Likhachev was in a 
position of some authority to comment on developments in Soviet culture in 
the post-Stalin period. The scholar was nevertheless careful to couch his ar-
guments in terms that would not cause consternation among Soviet offi  cials. 
Writing in 1961 about the need to establish an offi  cial movement for the con-
servation of cultural and architectural monuments, Likhachev thus empha-
sized, in line with the political climate of the time, the Leninist derivation of 
this argument.17 The confl ation of Russian and Soviet patriotic arguments was 
made explicit in the closing remarks to Likhachev’s article: “The preservation 
15. For a discussion of the rise of social control in Khrushchev-era Soviet society, see 
Melanie Ilic, introduction to Ilic and Smith, eds., Soviet State and Society, 3.
16. See, for example, Dmitrii Likhachev’s strictures on the shortcomings in national 
heritage preservation in Literaturnaia gazeta in 1965: D. S. Likhachev, “Chetvertoe izme-
renie,” Literaturnaia gazeta, June 10, 1965, 2; D. S. Likhachev, “Iz letnikh putishestvii,” Li-
teraturnaia gazeta, September 14, 1965, 2; and Vladimir Soloukhin’s patriotically inspired 
defense of Russian cultural authenticity, “Pis΄ma iz Russkogo muzeia,” fi rst published in 
Molodaia gvardiia in 1966 and republished in various later editions, for example, in V. A. 
Soloukhin, Slavianskaia etrad΄ (Moscow, 1972).
17. Picking up on the offi  cial emphasis on democratism in the post-Stalin era, the 
scholar stressed the democratic potential of heritage preservation: “The principle of 
democratism in everything that concerns the preservation and propagandizing of  cultural 
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and study of monuments to the great history of the Russian people must be 
given greater attention than it is at present. It is impossible to nourish Soviet 
patriotism without nourishing pride in the great past of our people [narod].”18 
While the privileged status attributed to Russian cultural heritage in this 
statement might have made Likhachev vulnerable to accusations of national 
chauvinism, the link with the offi  cial goal of promoting Soviet patriotism and 
the ultimate dissolution of the distinction between “Russian” and “Soviet” in 
the national imaginary of the narod lent the argument offi  cial credibility.
Another group of infl uential cultural fi gures concerned with the preserva-
tion of Russian heritage and traditions was the so-called village prose writ-
ers.19 At their most prolifi c between 1953 and 1980, this group of conservative 
cultural commentators wrote, sometimes in a strikingly unguarded fashion, 
about the threat posed by Soviet modernization to traditional ways of life, 
norms, and practices in Russian villages. Among the most evocative literary 
products of this movement were Vasilii Belov’s lyrical Privichnoe delo (1966), 
which detailed the breakdown of one peasant family as a consequence of the 
destructive imposition of collectivization on a Russian farming community, 
and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Matrenin dvor (1963), which narrated the sym-
bolic death of a simple Russian baba under the wheels of an industrial freight 
train. Far from being mere nostalgic accounts of a disappearing way of life, 
however, these texts were acts of preservation in themselves, documenting in 
near-ethnographic detail, in some cases, the dialectical specifi cities, norms of 
behavior, and everyday practices of the communities they described. These 
vivid depictions of life in the Russian villages, fi lled with drunken swash-
buckling and grandmotherly superstition, so distant from the dry, ideologi-
cally inspired kolkhoz literature that had come before, were undoubtedly one 
of the reasons for the genre’s immense popularity among Soviet readers in the 
1960s and 1970s.
What, then, was the nature of the relationship between the Russian na-
tionalist intelligentsia and the Communist Party leadership? While this ques-
tion has generated considerable interest among scholars of Russian national-
ism, analysis has generally focused on the post-1965 period rather than the 
late Khrushchev era. Indeed, the year 1965 has tended to be seen as a turning 
point in the history of Russian nationalism, as the moment when the argu-
ments of Russian patriots received offi  cial endorsement from the regime, not 
least through the creation of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of 
Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIK).20 But if we can talk of a growth 
monuments is of the utmost importance.” Dmitrii Likhachev, “Pamiatniki kul t΄ury—
vsenarodnoe dostoianie,” Istoriia SSSR, no. 3 (1961): 9.
18. Ibid., 11.
19. Kathleen Parthé has argued in her seminal study of the genre that village prose 
was “the most aesthetically coherent and ideologically important body of literature that 
was published in the Soviet Union between the death of Stalin and the ascendancy of 
Gorbachev.” Kathleen Parthé, Russian Village Prose: The Radiant Past (Princeton, 1992).
20. For a discussion of VOOPIK’s role in fostering Soviet patriotism in the Brezhnev 
era, see Nikolai Mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia: Dvizhenie russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR 
1953–1985 gody (Moscow, 2003), 300–37; and Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: 
Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991 (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). Catriona 
Kelly has explored the organization’s activities in Leningrad/St. Petersburg in “‘A Dis-
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in offi  cially endorsed national patriotism in the late 1960s, what of offi  cial 
attitudes to the past in the fi rst half of the 1960s? Nikolai Mitrokhin has ar-
gued that the Russian Communist Party was, in eff ect, an ethnonationalist 
party characterized by a xenophobic outlook and chauvinistic tendencies 
as early as 1953.21 Yet there would appear to be a perceptible diff erence be-
tween the regime’s fl irtation with national patriotism in the late Khrushchev 
era and the so-called inclusionary politics of the Brezhnev administration. 
Rather than an outright appropriation of nationalist arguments in an attempt 
to defuse their infl ammatory potential, as Yitzhak Brudny has argued oc-
curred under Brezhnev, the Khrushchev regime was involved in a more com-
plex relationship of collaboration with patriotic elements in Soviet society.22 
This  relationship resembled more the “intricate feedback loop” that Francine 
Hirsch has described in connection with the processes of exchange between 
the Bolsheviks and local administrators and ethnographers in her study of 
nation-making in the early Soviet period.23 Russian patriotism undoubtedly 
shaped Khrushchev-era politics, but this took place at the same time as the 
authorities strengthened their control over cultural institutions in an eff ort to 
advance their program of re-ideologization. Nowhere was this clearer than on 
the local stage, where the intellectual elite was involved in the delicate task of 
promoting local culture while at the same time demonstrating that their patri-
otism was the correct “Soviet” kind. In the remainder of this article, I focus on 
the negotiation of these agendas through the lens of the kraevedenie revival 
to shed further light on the nature of patriotic politics in late Khrushchev-era 
Russia.
Craft ing Soviet Localism
Khrushchev’s decision to use the kraevedenie movement as a means of foster-
ing Soviet patriotism was the latest chapter in a turbulent history for the fi eld of 
local study. The early Soviet incarnation of the movement had cohered around 
the Central Bureau of Kraevedenie (TsBK), a body under the Commissariat of 
Enlightenment which was initially intended to coordinate the eff orts of lo-
cal volunteers in their struggle to protect valuable documents and artifacts 
during the ruinous years of civil war (1917–22).24 Kraevedenie had acquired 
strong institutional foundations and a certain social status by the end of the 
1920s, yet the years of centralization and hegemony of Moscow that followed 
resulted in it being viewed with increased suspicion by the state as a breeding 
sonant Note on the Neva’: Historical Memory and City Identity in Russia’s Second Capital 
during the Post-Stalin Era,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 72–83. See also Ste-
ven Maddox, Saving Stalin’s Imperial City: Historic Preservation in Leningrad, 1930–1950 
(Bloomington, 2015).
21. Mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia, 300–37.
22. Brudny, Reinventing Russia.
23. Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of 
the Soviet Union (Ithaca, 2005), 12.
24. Johnson, How St. Petersburg Learned to Study Itself, 157. See also Ekaterina 
Mel΄nikova, “‘Sblizhalis΄ narody kraia, predstavitelem kotorogo iavliaius΄ ia’: Kraeved-
cheskoe dvizhenie 1920–1930-kh godov i sovetskaia natsional΄naia politika,” Ab Imperio, 
no. 1 (2012): 209–40.
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ground for regional separatism. As a consequence, the fi eld was targeted in 
the academic purge of 1929–31 and its activities were brought under the con-
trol of the central government. Following the repression of its leading fi gures, 
the movement transformed into an extension of the state apparatus geared 
toward the fulfi llment of plans and the promotion of state propaganda.25
The fi rst major change in attitudes to kraevedenie work came with the 
Twentieth Party Congress, in 1956, following which the preservation of local 
historical knowledge began to be explicitly linked with the general improve-
ment of cultural and academic life in the country. One of the most important 
institutional changes that followed this event was the transfer of responsi-
bility for the work of museums and the preservation of monuments to the 
Ministry of Culture. This de facto upgrading of the status of museum work 
had dramatic implications for the kraevedenie movement, the institutional 
infrastructure of which began to expand rapidly across the Russian regions. 
Kraevedenie museums opened in new oblast centers such as Kaliningrad and 
Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and many new museums were established in industrial 
towns such as Berezniki and Puchezh.26 It was only following the Twenty-
Second Party Congress of 1961, however, that the role of kraevedenie work in 
the moral education of the nation became a central preoccupation of cultural 
politics. As the government focused on the need to reengage the Soviet public 
in the task of building communism, so the importance of a movement that 
directly engaged the community in the study of their own Soviet traditions 
and culture became more obvious.
The top-down regeneration of local studies directly impacted the work 
of regional cultural institutions. For local museums, the revival reversed a 
process of institutional deterioration that had been underway since the end of 
WWII. In the fi rst postwar decade, many regional museums had found them-
selves in exceptionally diffi  cult circumstances, with little or no funds for the 
purchase of exhibits, serious staffi  ng problems, and lamentable material con-
ditions for the preservation of the objects in their stores.27 A survey carried out 
by the Ministry of State Control between 1952 and 1954, for example, revealed 
that the majority of the sixty-seven kraevedenie and memorial museums vis-
ited in eleven regions of the country were unfi t for their purpose. In her article 
on museum activity in the postwar period, V. I. Zlatoustova cites the case of 
the Nikol s΄kii museum in Vologda, whose stocks were found to contain just 
742 objects, 500 of which were coins, as indicative of the perceived faults in 
museum work at this time.28 The lamentable picture of museum activity that 
emerged from the ministry’s report prompted a Declaration of the Council of 
25. As much is revealed by the entry for “kraevedenie” in the 1937 edition of the 
Bol s΄haia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, which states, rather dryly, that “K. is characterized 
by a class-conscious dedication to the interest of socialist construction, its mass nature, 
its topical relevance, and its specifi c, scientifi c and planned character.” O. Shmidt et al., 
“Kraevedenie,” Bol s΄haia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Moscow, 1937), 34:522.
26. D. A. Ravikovich, Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi muzeinoi seti (1917–pervaia 
polovina 60-kh gg.): Nauchno-metodicheskie rekomendatsii (Moscow, 1988), 143.
27. V. I. Zlatoustova, “Gosudarstvennaia politika v oblasti muzeinogo dela (1945–1985 
gg.),” in S. A. Kasparinekaia, ed., Muzei i vlast :΄ Sbornik nauchnykh trudov (Moscow, 1991), 
232–37.
28. Ibid., 240.
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Ministers of RSFSR on January 11, 1954, “On the Serious Shortcomings in the 
Work of Kraevedenie and Memorial Museums of the Ministry of Culture of the 
RSFSR and Means for the Improvement of Their Activities.” In the aft ermath of 
the Declaration, thirty-three regional kraevedenie museums were closed and 
another seven were turned into libraries.29 The fate of the remaining kraeve-
denie institutions depended on their capacity to transform themselves into ef-
fective institutions of cultural and enlightenment work that could contribute 
to the project of building a communist society.
With the rehabilitation of kraevedenie as a means to “cultivate in work-
ers a feeling of Soviet patriotism, love for their region and for their socialist 
Motherland,” the fate of such museums began to change.30 Following the in-
stitutional cull of the mid-1950s, the early 1960s saw a drive to expand and 
“improve” the work of regional kraevedcheskie institutions. The most signifi -
cant legislative act in this regard was the 1964 declaration “On the Improve-
ment of the Role of Museums in the Communist Education of the Workers,” 
which singled out kraevedenie work as a means “to familiarize workers with 
the historical relics of our people, materials about the history of factories, 
kolkhozes, and sovkhozes.”31 The declaration gave rise to another fl urry of 
openings, as kraevedenie museums and kraevedcheskie sections of museums 
mushroomed across the country.32 Rather than stockpiling coins or religious 
paraphernalia, however, these institutions were tasked with a clear politi-
cal objective: to present a picture of local history and culture that refl ected 
the main tenets of the teleological narrative of socialist construction. Vague 
timelines of local history were thus reshaped to correspond to the established 
milestones of Soviet history—the revolution, WWII, and postwar reconstruc-
tion, for example—and local heroes emerged from among the ranks of the 
local worker and peasant populations.
The central authorities were not always convinced of the local govern-
ment’s capacity to implement these reforms independently and, accordingly, 
sent groups of experts from Leningrad and Moscow to observe and advise on 
the work of regional cultural institutions. One such group sent to Novgorod 
in the early 1960s criticized the local kraevedcheskii museum for the weak-
ness of the Soviet section of its display.33 Similar groups of experts deemed 
29. Ibid.
30. This quotation is taken from a letter to the head of the Regional Department for 
Culture and director of the Novgorod Museum from the head of the Regional Cultural 
Authorities in Novgorod, K. Daineko, in response to the recommendations of the Main 
Authorities for Cultural and Enlightening Institutions under the Ministry of Culture. 
Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi ob e΄dinennyi muzei (NGOM), op. 1, d. 410, l. 24.
31. Postanovlenie TsK KPSS “O povyshenii roli muzeev v kommunisticheskom vospi-
tanii trudiachshikhsia,” printed in the newspaper Politicheskoe somoobrazovanie, №6, 
1964, quoted in Zlatoustova, “Gosudarstvennaia politika,” 262.
32. These institutions were founded not only in regional capitals but also in smaller 
settlements, such as Valdai, Staraia Russa, and Borovichi, in the Novgorod region, and 
Velikie Luki, Sebezh, Porkhov, and Pechory, in the Pskov region. NGOM, istoricheskaia 
spravka, op. 1; annual report of the Pskov Cultural Authorities for 1965, Gosudarstvennyi 
arkhiv Pskovskoi oblasti (GAPO), f. R-1855, op. 1, d. 247, l. 143.
33. These criticisms were voiced at a meeting of researchers from historical-
 architectural museums of the RSFSR, held in Novgorod in November 1960. Among those 
participating at the meeting were representatives of the Ministry of Culture and direc-
tors and vice-directors of national museums. See NGOM, op. 1, d. 380 (Materials on the 
This content downloaded from 138.251.14.35 on Wed, 28 Oct 2015 15:28:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
474 Slavic Review
the exhibition of socialist history in Vologda’s kraevedcheskii museum to be 
too generic and to require enhancement through the inclusion of locally de-
rived exhibits that illustrated the developments that had taken place in the 
region since the establishment of Soviet power.34 Local museum collectives 
dutifully responded to such criticisms by undertaking expeditions to the sur-
rounding regions in search of ideologically resonant local artifacts. One such 
expedition to the Okulovskii and Krestetskii regions in Novgorod in 1962 thus 
produced a haul that included materials about the technical reconstruction 
of the Okulovskii weaving factory and the activities of its workers.35 A similar 
expedition to the Vytegorsk region of the Vologda oblast in 1961 resulted in 
the acquisition of a severed ribbon and scissors from the opening of the Vyte-
gorsk hydro- electric complex, a fi tter’s uniform from the workshop fl oor, and 
a list of socialist pledges from the Vologda linen factory.36 Such materials were 
integrated into exhibitions such as “The Region in the Postwar Period, 1920–
1940” and “The Region in the Period of Reconstruction and Rapid Economic 
Growth in the Postwar Period, 1945–1958” that celebrated developments in 
local culture as a microcosm of the societal changes taking place in the nation 
as a whole.37
Local memory remained narrowly defi ned in the 1960s, focusing on epi-
sodes and events from the local past that corresponded with the ideological 
preoccupations of the post-Stalin regime. This much is clear from a 1963 plan 
to reorganize the materials from the prerevolutionary section of the Vologda 
kraevedenie museum, “The Vologda Region from the Twelft h to the Begin-
ning of the Twentieth Century.” This plan revealed the museum’s attempts to 
strengthen the local character of the historical narrative while at the same time 
making eff orts to align the local experience with the political reality of the 
time. For example, while emphasizing Vologda’s role as a “second capital” 
during the rule of Ivan the Terrible, the section was purged of materials related 
to the historical fi gure of the tsar himself, presumably in line with the drive 
against cults of personality aft er 1956. Likewise, the replacement of materials 
about Peter the Great with information about the class character of Petrine 
politics refl ected the offi  cial emphasis on the Leninist principle of “collective 
leadership” at this time. If the development of Vologda’s milk production and 
timber industries was given pride of place in the display, the museum collec-
tive nevertheless thought it politic to include a quotation from Vladimir Lenin 
to underline the ideological integrity of the message.38 The fi nal result was 
a presentation of regional history that expertly negotiated the parameters of 
 proceedings of meetings and seminars of workers of architectural museum-zapovedniki 
of the RSFSR in Novgorod [plans, protocols]), ll. 13–49.
34. Vologodskii oblastnoi kraevedcheskii muzei (VOKM), op. 1, d. 403 (Reports on 
museum activity in 1961), ll. 1–4.
35. NGOM, op. 1, d. 429, l. 17.
36. VOKM, op. 1, d. 403, l. 2.
37. Ibid., l. 8.
38. The Lenin citation included in the display was the following: “Capital has all the 
newest developments and means not only to separate cream from milk but also to sepa-
rate milk from the children of the rural poor.” Ministerstvo kul t΄ury RSFSR, VOKM, op. 1, 
d. 491, ll. 2–17 (1963).
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state-sanctioned local patriotism, highlighting pertinent episodes from the 
local past and linking these with the achievements of the socialist present.
Museum workers were not the only group whose work was aff ected by the 
offi  cial endorsement of local history. Schools and schoolchildren were also 
directly targeted by the state in the eff ort to forge local patriotism and, con-
comitantly, foster support among the population for socialist construction. 
The most important legislative act in this regard was the Order of the Min-
istry of Enlightenment of the RSFSR of May 1961, “On the Strengthening of 
Kraevedenie Work in Schools and the Publication of Kraevedenie Materials 
for Schoolchildren.” This document underlined the role of kraevedenie work 
in transforming Soviet schoolchildren into politically conscious and engaged 
citizens, able to locate the abstract social and cultural transformations writ-
ten about in school textbooks in their local contexts:
The existing links between study and life need to be signifi cantly strength-
ened through kraevedenie work in schools. The use of kraevedenie materials 
in geography, biology, history, literature, and other lessons will allow pupils 
to acquire knowledge more consciously and to see evidence of the patterns 
they are studying in the world around them. The engagement of pupils in 
extra-curricular kraevedenie work will create more opportunities for them 
to apply the knowledge they have acquired to real life.39
In addition to the abstract logic behind the promotion of kraevedenie work 
in the classroom, the order also provided a number of practical instructions 
to school directors and teachers about how to strengthen local study in their 
institutions. These included the construction of kraevedenie rooms or cor-
ners in every school, the involvement of school pupils in the creation of local 
“chronicles” detailing the history of their village or town, and the promotion 
of architectural preservation among school-age children through their ac-
tive involvement in the upkeep of local monuments.40 Schools were encour-
aged to work actively with museums to improve pupils’ knowledge of their 
regions’ history and culture. A report on the work of the Vologda kraevedenie 
museum in 1961 demonstrates the ways in which this requirement for inter-
 institutional collaboration was implemented at a local level. In a section on 
“work with schoolchildren,” the report recorded plans to create kraevedenie-
themed study aids for pupils in the fourth and eighth grades to be used during 
school trips. Pupils would be able to choose from sets of materials on themes 
such as “your region in the distant past,” “the struggle of workers in the local 
area under capitalism,” “World War II and the Soviet people against the fas-
cist invaders,” and “the present and past in the local area.” In a similar way to 
museum exhibitions, which presented the viewer with a specifi cally socialist 
understanding of the local past, these exercises were designed to inculcate in 
schoolchildren an appreciation of local history and culture that corresponded 
to the political agenda of the time.
A third area of local cultural activity that was directly aff ected by the state-
sponsored regeneration of kraevedenie work was architectural preservation 
39. NGOM, op. 1, d. 410, l. 24.
40. Ibid.
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and heritage tourism. While the rise of heritage preservation has tended to be 
associated with the establishment of VOOPIK, in 1965, there is evidence that 
architectural conservation was already a priority in the late Khrushchev era 
and that cultural monuments were explicitly linked with the re-ideologizing 
agenda of the period. This process was particularly notable in the historic 
center of Russia, where local architectural heritage was marketed to a do-
mestic audience in the form of muzei-zapovedniki, or open-air architectural 
museums, that comprised the most prominent historical and cultural monu-
ments in the region, preserved in their traditional surrounds. Between Au-
gust 1958 and February 1959, a number of these zapovedniki were established 
in the medieval towns of Novgorod (August 1958), Kostroma (August 1958), 
Vladimir (September 1958), Gor΄kii (December 1958), and Yaroslavl΄ (Febru-
ary 1959).41 Their function was to engage the population in “rituals of public 
self- admiration,” to borrow Anne Gorsuch’s expression, directing citizens’ at-
tention to the majestic relics of medieval Rus΄  that formed the historical foun-
dation of the great Soviet state.42
Like the politically resonant exhibitions of local history, the preservation 
of architectural heritage and its exhibition to Soviet citizens was intended to 
generate a sense of pride in the material culture of the socialist state and, con-
comitantly, engagement with its values and ideals. Rather than consuming 
architectural beauty passively, spectators were expected to draw ideological 
lessons from the onion domes and fortress walls that they were confronted 
with in the zapovedniki. To this end, visitors to Russia’s medieval towns were 
off ered guidance in the form of kraevedcheskii literature and the expertise 
of local kraevedy, both of which they were encouraged to exploit prior to and 
during their trips to the regions.43 These mediating texts were intended to 
frame the tourist’s gaze, ensuring that the most politically salient features of 
the local architectural landscape were taken into account, while any quali-
ties that undermined the authoritative exegesis of local cultural heritage were 
elided from public view.
Changing patterns in publication fi gures for kraevedcheskii literature at 
this time reveal more general shift s in the balance of control over the production 
of local historical knowledge.44 The production of kraevedcheskie materials 
increased exponentially in the 1960s. In Novgorod, for example, seven books 
on local history, architecture, and culture were published between 1960 and 
41. Order of the Council of Ministers RSFSR of August 28, 1958, № 5639, in E. A. 
Shulepova, ed., Muzeevedcheskaia mysl΄ v Rossii XXVIII–XX vekov. Sbornik dokumen-
tov i materialov (Moscow, 2010), 885. See also Susan Nicole Smith, “The Creation of the 
 Vladimir-Suzdal Museum-Reserve: Preservation for a National Audience” (paper, Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Los Angeles, November 2010).
42. Anne E. Gorsuch, “‘There’s No Place Like Home’: Soviet Tourism in Late Stalin-
ism,” Slavic Review 62, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 771.
43. A pamphlet on tourism and kraevedenie published slightly later, in 1974, pointed 
out that conscientious tourists should make use of kraevedcheskie materials and report as 
soon as possible to local kraevedy in order to get the most out their touristic experience. 
See I. S. Iun e΄v, Kraevedenie i turizm (Moscow, 1974), 11–12.
44. The following statistics are drawn from work carried out with the card catalogue 
and in collaboration with local librarians at the Russian National Library in St. Petersburg 
in 2010.
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1969 with high print runs (25,000 copies or more), including one guide to the 
town’s historical monuments, Mikhail Karger’s Novgorod Velikii, published by 
Iskusstvo in 1961, with a print run of over 50,000 copies. This was a marked 
increase from the 1950–59 period, when just one historical guide with a print 
run of over 25,000 had been published. Likewise, in Pskov, four books of this 
genre with high print runs were published between 1960 and 1969, including 
one publication, Iurii Spegal s΄kii’s Pskov: Khudozhesvennie pamiatniki, again 
by Iskusstvo, in 1963, which had a tirazh of over 100,000 copies, compared to 
just one book with a high print run in the 1950–59 period. Perhaps even more 
signifi cant was the shift  in the ratio of guides written and produced locally 
to those published in Leningrad and Moscow. In Novgorod, for example, this 
ratio shift ed from nineteen locally produced guides to three published in the 
capital in the 1950s to seven locally produced versus eleven Leningrad- and 
Moscow-published guides in the 1960s. The simultaneous promotion of local 
narratives of history and culture and the tightening of central control over 
the production of these narratives is indicative of the tensions inherent to the 
kraevedenie revival. While a localization of historical memory can be argued 
to have occurred at this time, it was nevertheless closely supervised and vig-
orously censored in an eff ort to ensure local alignment with national cultural 
priorities.
How, then, was regional architectural heritage presented in such mate-
rials? And how were cultural monuments made to communicate the politi-
cal message of the late Khrushchev regime? Local guidebooks directed the 
tourist’s attention toward objects and sites that embodied certain ideals and 
values endorsed by the Soviet state. In particular, visitors to the zapovedniki 
of the northwest were encouraged to admire the centerpieces of medieval Rus-
sian architecture, buildings that were presented as objects of sublime and 
transcendental beauty. However, Soviet tourists were not supposed to pas-
sively consume this beauty. On the contrary, they were encouraged to fi nd 
parallels between the genius craft smen of the medieval age and the builders 
of socialism in the Khrushchev era. This was achieved through the guides’ 
insistence on the “laconicism” (lakonizm) and “democratism” (demokratizm) 
of the Old Russian architecture, which, it was implied, resembled the func-
tionalist aesthetic of the Khrushchev era. It is instructive to recall here that an 
aesthetic de-Stalinization was under way in the wake of the 1956 attack on the 
cult of personality which involved a thorough purge of the old regime’s visual 
culture. With regard to architecture, this equaled a rejection of the Empire 
style of the high Stalinist period, with its decorative extravagances and hints 
of Russian chauvinism, in favor of more populist, utilitarian form of archi-
tecture.45 When framing the Soviet tourist’s gaze on the architectural land-
scape in the medieval museum reserves, emphasis was thus placed on the 
“austere” (strogii) and “laconic” (lakonichnyi) forms that were “democratic” 
(demokraticheskii) and “authentic” (istinnyi), free from any loft y pretentions 
45. See the “Decree of the Central Committee of the KPSS and the Council of Ministers 
of the USSR of 4 November 1955 № 1871 ‘On the Elimination of Decorative Extravagances 
in Design and Construction Work,’” Sovarkh: Proekt Sovetskaia arkhitektura, at www.
sovarch.ru/postanovlenie55/ (last accessed March 2, 2015).
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or obscurantist “mysticism” (mistitsizm).46 This insistence on the “democrat-
ism” of the medieval architecture echoed the period’s political rhetoric, which 
emphasized the principle of “party democracy” as a corrective to the years of 
political perversion under Stalin.47
From the evidence presented above, it would appear justifi ed to view the 
kraevedenie revival as a top-down process of cultural regeneration in the Rus-
sian regions, in which local elites played a passive role as the implementers 
of policy decisions determined exclusively by the center. In reality, however, 
relations between central and regional cultural authorities were oft en more 
dynamic than this. As I remarked in the introduction to this discussion, rela-
tions between the center and the regions resembled more an intricate feedback 
loop, similar to that described by Hirsch in her study of Bolshevik cultural 
practices, than a case of top-down subordination. The kraevedenie revival 
may have been a state-sponsored phenomenon that was driven by actors and 
organs at the political center, but it also resulted in the endorsement of local 
initiative and, in connection with this, a growing sense of entitlement among 
regional elites to shape their own cultural policy. By endorsing a patriotic 
politics that privileged the role of local historical knowledge in communist 
socialization, the central authorities empowered local elites to make demands 
of the center. In the next section, I consider two cases of confl ict between 
central and regional cultural authorities, which reveal the nuanced nature of 
their relationship at this time.
Local Heritage or National Treasures?
In 1965, a revealing exchange took place between the secretary of the 
Novgorod obkom, A. Prokof e΄v, and the deputy head of Cultural Authori-
ties at the Ministry of Culture, V. Goncharov. In July, Prokof e΄v wrote to the 
ministry to query the proprietorship of the Vasil e΄vskii Gates, which were 
located at that time in Aleksandrov in the Vladimir oblast. Prokof e΄v argued 
that the gates were the lawful property of the Novgorod Sophia Cathedral, 
having been relocated to the Trinity Cathedral in Aleksandrov by Ivan IV 
following the unifi cation of Novgorod with Muscovy in 1478. Drawing on 
the argument that regional museums should exhibit locally specifi c objects 
that exemplifi ed the particular experience of that krai, Prokof e΄v pointed out 
that the gates were currently languishing in the stairwell of the Aleksandrov 
museum since they “don’t match its profi le.” Prokof e΄v justifi ed the gates’ 
relocation using the language and logic of the kraevedenie revival, which 
associated the promotion of local culture with the stimulation of national 
patriotism: “The Vasil e΄vskii doors will help create a more complete impres-
46. These descriptions of the northern Russian architectural style are taken from 
the guidebooks M. V. Fekhner, Arkhitektura gorodov SSSR: Vologda (Moscow, 1958), 42; 
and G. Bocharov and V. Vygolov, Vologda, Kirillov, Ferapontovo, Belozersk (Moscow, 
1969), 6.
47. For a discussion of the role of “party democracy” in Khrushchev’s campaign for 
power and legitimacy aft er Stalin, see Stephen Lovell, The Shadow of War: Russia and the 
USSR, 1941 to the Present (Malden, 2010), 44–47.
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sion of the ancient decoration of the cathedral and will make the Novgorod 
Sophia a real national treasure.”48
Despite Prokof e΄v’s adept handling of the ideological discourse, the 
Ministry of Culture rejected the request for the gates to be returned to the 
Novgorod cathedral. The reasons given for the refusal of the regional secre-
tary’s request reveal an interesting hierarchy of priorities related to patriotic 
politics at this time. Goncharov explained that the gates were not only part of 
the local narrative of the Democratic Republic of Novgorod but also part of a 
more culturally signifi cant national narrative of the unifi cation of the Russian 
lands under Ivan IV: “As such, the gates have been located in Aleksandrov for 
300 years, not by accident, but in connection with a distinct historical event, 
the creation of the Russian national state, and their location in the Trinity 
Cathedral of Aleksandrov is therefore historically justifi ed.”49 The implication 
here was that local memory, while nominally endorsed by the regime, could 
not challenge or detract from the foundation myths and narratives of the na-
tion. Goncharov underlined this point by alluding to hypothetical analogies 
to Novgorod’s claim that were intended to exemplify its absurdity: “In much 
the same way the town of Vladimir could lay claim to the icons of the Rub-
lev iconostasis from the Vladimir Assumption Cathedral, which are now in 
the Tret΄iakov Gallery and the Russian Museum, as well as to a number of 
other major works of art, which have ended up as a consequence in the State 
Historical Museum, the Armory Museum, and so on.”50 Interestingly, these 
hypothetical absurdities, whereby regions would claim ownership of objects 
of national signifi cance, were closer to reality than Goncharov made out. In-
deed, in his letter to the ministry, Prokof e΄v had not limited his demands to 
the Vasil e΄vskii Gates but had gone further, laying claim to “Novgorodian” 
objects that were at that time being held at the Russian Museum in Lenin-
grad, including the Liudogoshchenskii cross (1359), a carved image of Var-
laam Khutynskii (1560), a polyptych with engravings of Nikolai Mozhaiskii 
(c. 15th–16th century), engraved plaques from the funeral of Savva Visherskii, 
and a carved wooden sculpture of the Paraskeva Piatnitsa Church.51 While 
these claims were ultimately unsuccessful, their very articulation reveals an 
antagonism between cultural authorities at the center and in the regions over 
what constituted local versus national cultural heritage. The endorsement of 
local patriotic consciousness, it would seem, had exacerbated such antago-
nisms, encouraging their manifestation in open confl icts of this sort.
Indeed, the Novgorod secretary was not the only one engaged in disputes 
over the ownership of objects of Russian cultural heritage. Another reveal-
ing clash had occurred between the Russian Museum and the Pskov Regional 
Cultural Authorities three years earlier, in 1962, with regard to a number of 
objects of early Russian art excavated from Pskovian churches. The confl ict 
began with a letter sent in July 1962 from the director of the Russian Museum, 
48. NGOM, op. 1, d. 480 (Correspondence with the Ministry of Culture and museum 
authorities concerning matters connected with the work of the museum), l. 35. Emphasis 
added.
49. Ibid., l. 43.
50. Ibid., l. 44.
51. Ibid., l. 36.
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I. P. Pushkarev, to the Pskov Cultural Authorities, explaining that, in line with 
offi  cial orders, the Russian Museum would be sending a group of specialists 
in Old Russian art to Pskov in order to investigate the regional churches’ con-
tents, the most valuable of which would be sent to the Pskov Museum and to 
a specialist foundation in Leningrad for further study and restoration work.52 
This proposal met with a cold reception from the director of the Pskov Mu-
seum, I. N. Larionov, who claimed that rather than philanthropic patronage 
on the part of the Russian Museum, this was one more in a series of cynical 
maneuvers intended to procure the region’s most important works of art for 
the Leningrad institution.
Before 1960, Larionov explained in a letter to the deputy head of the 
Main Authorities for Artistic Aff airs, the Russian Museum had transported 
eight early examples of Pskov artwork to Leningrad without the local cultural 
authorities’ knowledge. Following research in the region carried out in the 
 summer of 1961—again without the local authorities’ knowledge—another 
icon had been transported to Leningrad from the town of Ostrov. Following 
objections about this clandestine work in the region, Larionov continued, 
Pushkarev had informed the local authorities that “henceforward such ques-
tions will not be decided in consultation with [the local authorities].” To add 
insult to injury, when the Pskov Museum had requested that one of their icons 
be cleaned in preparation for a local exhibition, they were told that this could 
only be done by the Russian Museum at a cost of 500 rubles.53 The last straw 
had come when the Russian Museum pulled out of an expedition to unstud-
ied areas of the Pskov region following the local authorities’ insistence that 
a specialist from the Pskov Museum be included in the ranks of the expe-
dition team. Larionov drew the inevitable conclusion from this action: “The 
important thing for them was obviously not the discovery and preservation of 
monuments (as it was stated in the order from the Ministry of Culture), since 
the Pskov Museum has excellent means to preserve old paintings and can 
at any time call on the assistance of restorers at the [restoration workshop] 
but rather the question of where these 13th-, 14th-, and 15th-century objects 
would be kept.”54
Such clashes between regional and national cultural authorities allow us 
to nuance our understanding of the priorities behind the kraevedenie revival 
and its cultural consequences. First, it would appear that while ostensibly 
supporting the localization of cultural knowledge, on the grounds that pride 
in one’s locality would engender pride in one’s nation, thereby strengthen-
ing social solidarity in the state, central authorities nevertheless continued to 
privilege the interests of national culture over those of local culture and to as-
sign responsibility for cultural heritage accordingly. While this fact is unsur-
prising in a multinational state whose territorial integrity depended on myths 
of national solidarity and brotherhood between peoples, the consequences of 
this contradictory policy, which encouraged expressions of local patriotism, 
52. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 157 (Plans for the restoration of cultural monuments and 
correspondence with the ministry about their preservation), l. 23.
53. Ibid., l. 50.
54. Ibid.
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on the one hand, while denying requests for material affi  rmation of this sta-
tus, on the other, are perhaps more interesting. As Prokof e΄v’s and Larionov’s 
commentaries demonstrate, local cultural elites were far from passive actors 
in this process of cultural regeneration in the regions. Exploiting the authori-
tative discourse of cultural patriotism with skill and expertise, they were able 
to advance far-reaching demands that would have been impossible in the 
years of Stalinist centralization. While these claims were not always success-
ful, they nevertheless reveal an attitude of entitlement that itself indicates a 
fundamental shift  in center-region relations at the level of cultural policy.
Patriots of Their Towns
To what extent, then, was the late Khrushchev-era kraevedenie revival suc-
cessful in achieving the goals it set out for itself? And how did this (albeit 
moderated) awakening of local cultural consciousness aff ect center-region 
relations in the late Soviet period? As I have argued in this article, the regen-
eration of local studies in the Russian regions can be understood within the 
context of the Khrushchev regime’s campaign for mass re-ideologization aft er 
1961. This second, reconstitutive phase of de-Stalinization was marked by a 
rise in controlled Soviet patriotism, within which offi  cially sanctioned visions 
of local history and culture were marketed to local populations in an eff ort to 
galvanize popular support for the project of building communism.
Judging by public commentaries preserved in local archives, it would 
appear that the regime was partly successful in realizing this objective, at 
least at a discursive level. By the mid-1960s, citizens had experienced suf-
fi cient exposure to the patriotic discourse to be able to reproduce its rhetori-
cal tone and tropes with relative ease. Throughout the decade that followed 
the Twenty-Second Party Congress, schoolchildren, workers, and pensioners 
regularly penned letters to local cultural institutions, left  commentaries in 
museum response books, and wrote texts to accompany their own displays of 
local history and culture that demonstrated a developed awareness of insti-
tutional expectations of how local patriotism ought to be performed. In their 
correspondence with local cultural institutions, local “patriots” in the north-
west thus focused on areas of sanctioned historical interest, such as the ar-
chitectural history of local monuments, local war heroes, the liberation of the 
region from wartime occupation, medieval burial mounds, and other heroic 
local topoi. Entries in regional museum response books also demonstrated 
a high level of ideological awareness, as commentators expertly traced the 
contours of the offi  cial patriotic discourse, shift ing from praise for the pres-
ervation of local culture to acknowledgement of the main goals of socialist 
construction.
Yet it would appear that the popular affi  rmation of local patriotism was 
more than a matter of public posturing and social conformism. The entries 
left  by groups of tourists who attended patriotic excursions around the sights 
of Novgorod in the 1960s provide some illustration of the positive manner in 
which such events were received. A group of visitors from Moscow, for example, 
complimented their guide on the “profound love and patriotism” with which 
he presented his lectures on local history. Visitors from Leningrad echoed 
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these words, congratulating another member of the museum staff  on the pa-
triotic tone of her presentation: “It is clear from the way she speaks that she’s a 
patriot of her town.” In a particularly laudatory entry, a group of tourists from 
Moscow demanded institutional recognition of their guide’s “ knowledge and 
sincere Novgorodian patriotism.”55 From these entries it would appear clear 
that local patriotism was not merely a nominal requirement of local tourist 
guides but rather one that was enthusiastically implemented in practice and 
positively received by consumers of local culture.
The institutionalization of interest in the local past resulted in a discern-
able growth in local historical consciousness. Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, many of the factories, collective farms, and institutes providing work 
for local populations established their own historical museums.56 Local com-
munities were encouraged to engage in microhistorical analysis, to ponder the 
evolution of the individual institutions that formed their social and cultural 
lives. Moreover, members of local communities were directly implicated in the 
history-making process, contributing objects from their personal and family 
archives—samples of weaving, embroidery, and lacemaking, decorated spin-
ning wheels, looms, mortars, and salt cellars—to museum exhibitions.57 The 
“museumization” of everyday life in the Russian regions impressed on people 
the relevance of their own contribution to the goals of socialist construction, 
but it also stimulated curiosity about the collective past and raised questions 
about the role of the locality in the events that formed the national historical 
narrative.
With the curtains drawn back to reveal the historiographical mechanism, 
people were empowered to refl ect on the constructedness of institutional 
memory and to begin to question the selection of episodes, objects, and events 
from the past for historical preservation. While it would be an exaggeration 
to speak of sites of “contested memory” existing at this time, the growth in 
public demand for information about the past can be seen to have created the 
potential for exposure of historical blurring or, indeed, the falsifi cation of his-
tory on the part of the state. Communities became increasingly aware of their 
collective pasts as a consequence of lectures, fi lms, exhibitions, and publica-
tions and were alerted to the need to maintain an architectural record of local 
history on the landscape. At the same time, they became conscious of the gap 
between the theoretical endorsement of cultural conservation and the reality 
of selective preservation, censorship, and neglect.58 This was particularly true 
55. See the response and suggestion book of the Novgorod Council for Tourism and 
Excursions for 1968–72. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Novgorodskoi oblasti (GANO), f. R-4063, 
op. 2–10, d. 140a, ll. 2, 3, and 9.
56. A list of museums in the Vologda region compiled in 1974 included the museums 
at the “Glory of Work” sewing factory, the Vologda car equipment plant, and the Vologda 
sheepskin and fur factory. See the 1974 report on the conditions of folk and industrial 
museums in the Vologda region. VOKM, op. 1, d. 784, ll. 59–60.
57. See the report on the Novgorod museum collective’s expeditions to villages 
in the Novgorod region for the collection of museum exhibit materials. NGOM, op. 1, 
d. 429, l. 17.
58. The disconnect between public discourse and local reality with regard to the pres-
ervation of architectural heritage was the focus of a number of letters sent to local au-
thorities and newspapers in the 1960s. See, for example, the opinions expressed by a local 
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of the conservation of cultural heritage. Rather than strengthening identifi ca-
tion with the ideals and values of the socialist state, the preservationist drive 
provided a center around which controversy could cohere and a vocabulary 
with which to articulate frustrations with the political authorities.
This was perhaps the central paradox of the offi  cial drive to stimulate lo-
cal patriotism in the late Khrushchev period. Through its affi  rmation of local 
identity and the provision of a state-endorsed patriotic discourse, the regime 
stimulated a sense of entitlement among local actors as stakeholders in the 
construction of local memory. From local offi  cials such as Prokof e΄v and Lari-
onov to the authors of letters about the preservation of architectural heritage, 
local actors were able to exploit the vocabulary of state patriotism in order 
to further local interests. Local offi  cials and inhabitants’ readiness to chal-
lenge the relevant authorities on matters of historical memory demonstrates 
the radically changed political environment of the late Khrushchev-era turn 
to history, distinguishing it from earlier, Stalinist cases of historical revision-
ism. These altered political conditions ultimately meant that the state was less 
eff ective in realizing its political objectives. If the regeneration of interest in 
local history and traditions had been intended to foster support for the con-
struction of communism, in reality it succeeded in drawing attention to the 
subjective and arbitrary nature of historical memory, undermining the state’s 
authority to control the interpretation of the most fundamental component of 
national and local identity—the past.
electrician in Novgorod concerning the decision to exclude many “old buildings” (starie 
doma), which the author considered to be “monuments” (pamiatniki), if not “architectural 
masterpieces” (shedevry zodchestva), from local heritage lists. G. Melomedov, “O gorode 
moem rodnom,” Novgorodskaia pravda, January 6, 1967, 4. See also the commentary of a 
local resident published in a letter to the editor in Novgorodskaia pravda in 1968 concern-
ing the state’s selective preservation of churches in the local region. I. Mikhailov, “Pis΄ma 
v redaktsiiu,” Novgorodskaia pravda, March 10, 1968, 4.
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